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1 Introduction
The tendency for airline ticket prices to rise as the scheduled departure date approaches is
one of the most well-known regularities of dynamic oligopoly pricing. This tendency is often
regarded as a prime example of intertemporal price discrimination, reflecting that customers
in the airline industry are likely to have different demand elasticities correlating with their
ability or willingness to book in advance.1 While there is now a small empirical literature
with a focus on intertemporal price discrimination when firms have monopoly power (e.g.,
Lazarev, 2013; Williams, 2013), our understanding on the scope and working of intertemporal
price discrimination in oligopoly markets is still limited. However, many important markets
are oligopolistic and it is far from obvious how insights into intertemporal price discrimination
from monopoly markets extend to oligopolies.
In this paper, we take a step towards filling this gap using new data on the time path of
prices from the European airline industry. In particular, we empirically explore how pricing
dynamics vary with the competitive environment and to what extend the identified variations
are consistent with intertemporal price discrimination.
From an empirical perspective, the analysis of pricing dynamics has proved difficult
mainly due to a lack of public data. In the airline industry, price data has been available
at a (quarterly) level that does not allow to differentiate intertemporal price variations for
a given flight (on a given date and time) from variations across different travel dates and
from variations across different flights on a given route. This has led the empirical price
discrimination literature to focus on the impact of competition on broader dispersion measures
that do not differentiate among different dimensions of dispersion (e.g, Borenstein and Rose,
1994; Hayes and Ross, 1998; Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009; Dai, Liu and Serfes, 2014). We
address this issue using manually collected data on posted online prices.2 In particular, we
construct a panel including about 1.4 million prices for airline tickets on the intra-European
market where for each route-date pair (which we refer to as a “market”) we record a time
series of posted prices ranging from 10 weeks to 1 day prior to departure. Using this time
series dimension permits us to shift the focus on pricing dynamics and their determinants.
We begin our analysis by estimating the intertemporal slope of prices and its sensitivity
1The usual example are business travelers who learn about travel requirements at short notice and have
a high willingness to pay for traveling at a particular time, and leisure travelers who have longer planning
horizons and may be more flexible regarding their choice of time or even destination.
2Recent studies using similar approaches to collect posted airline price data include Lazarev (2013) and
Williams (2013) who also explore pricing dynamics, but focus on monopoly markets. In contrast, McAfee
and Te Velde (2007), Gaggero and Piga (2011), Escobari (2012), and Escobari, Rupp and Meskey (2013)
collect competitive price data, but are interested in the determinants of price levels and dispersion rather
than pricing dynamics and their determinants.
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to competition. Overall, we find that prices in our sample increase substantially over time,
but at a rate that is highly sensitive to competition. While monopoly prices increase by an
average of 1.31 percent with every day that a customer waits to book, this slope is reduced to
1.19 percent in duopolies and continues to decrease monotonically to a slope of 0.93 percent
in markets with five competing airlines. A nonparametric treatment of pricing dynamics
further reveals that these differences are mainly driven by the last 5 weeks before departure.
Over this period, prices on monopoly routes increase by 95 percent, while prices on routes
served by five competitors increase by only 60 percent.
At a first sight, these pricing dynamics are consistent with a theory of competitive price
discrimination, reflecting the idea that competition restrains the ability of airlines to price-
discriminate between customers with long planning horizons and customers who book at
short notice. In an effort to make this argument more rigorous, we use hotel bookings data
to construct measures for the tourist intensity in a given market and to proxy for variations
in customer heterogeneity. If price discrimination is a major aspect of dynamic oligopoly
pricing, then the degree to which an airline’s ability to price-discriminate becomes restrained
as competition intensifies should depend on how much the airline would discriminate if it
were unconstrained by competition. Put differently, if price discrimination plays an important
role, competition should have a stronger impact on the intertemporal slope in markets with
considerable customer heterogeneity.
Consistent with these considerations, we find that the sensitivity of the pricing dynamics
to competition varies substantially with our proxies for customer heterogeneity. In markets
characterized by a highly heterogeneous customer base, competition flattens the intertemporal
slope from a daily rate of 1.42 percent in monopolies to 0.90 percent in markets with 5
competitors. In contrast, we find that in markets characterized by little customer heterogeneity,
competition has virtually no impact on the intertemporal slope.
Comparing our results to the empirical price discrimination literature, the negative
relation between competition and the intertemporal slope appears to be in line with the
finding of Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) that competition decreases dispersion (measured by
the Gini coefficient on a given route across flights and travel dates), but it appears to be
inconsistent with Borenstein and Rose (1994) who find the opposite.3 Using the ability to
distinguish between the different dimensions of dispersion in our data, we show that the
negative relation between competition and price dispersion is strongest when dispersion
is defined as intertemporal within-flight dispersion; i.e., the dispersion in prices paid for
the same physical flight. When dispersion is, in contrast, defined by pooling either across
3See also Dai, Liu and Serfes (2014) for evidence pointing towards a non-monotonic effect of competition
on the price dispersion across flights and travel dates.
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travel dates or across different flights that an airline operates on the same route, the relation
becomes diluted (in the former case) or overturned (in the latter case). Hence, while we find
competition to have an unambiguous negative impact on intertemporal price dispersion, the
relation between competition and cross-flight dispersion in our data is less clear, which may
explain seemingly contradicting findings in the earlier literature.
In the context of the empirical price discrimination literature, it is natural to ask: how
much of the intertemporal price dispersion observed in our data is due to the pricing dynamics
described above, and how much is due to unsystematic volatility within flights? We find that
for the average flight the identified pricing dynamics account for 83 percent of the overall
dispersion of prices for the same physical flight. That is, while there is a random component
in prices that is consistent with stochastic demand fluctuations, a large share of the pricing
dynamics that we observe follows a pre-determined path.
Looking at the differences in pricing dynamics across markets, about 17 percent of
the observed variation can be explained by competition and our measures of customer
heterogeneity. On the one hand, this underscores again the significant impact of competition
and customer heterogeneity on pricing dynamics. On the other hand, this leaves a substantial
amount of unexplained variation in pricing dynamics. This suggests that, while the impact of
stochastic demand fluctuations on prices is small compared to the systematic trend of prices
to increase, idiosyncratic fluctuations are likely to play a distinct role in explaining variations
in trends across markets.4
The paper relates most closely to two areas of the literature: the empirical price dispersion
literature and the literature on dynamic pricing schemes in oligopoly markets. In the context
of the price dispersion literature (Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Hayes and Ross, 1998; Stavins,
2001; Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009), it is closely related to the works of Gaggero and Piga (2011)
and Puller, Sengupta and Wiggins (2015), isolating specific dimensions of price dispersion.5
Our paper provides a unifying perspective to these works by disentangling various dimensions
of price dispersion and by linking them to an explicit identification of pricing dynamics.
Our investigation of pricing dynamics also complements a growing literature that examines
dynamic pricing strategies in various industries.6 In the airline industry, Lazarev (2013)
4See also, Alderighi, Nicolini and Piga (2012) and Williams (2013) for empirical evidence that airlines
dynamically adjust prices in response to demand fluctuations.
5In particular, Puller, Sengupta and Wiggins (2015) study within-route price dispersion to empirically
evaluate the “peak-load” pricing mechanisms formalizes by Gale and Holmes (1992, 1993) and Dana (1998,
1999a,b, 2001). Similar to our analysis in Section 6, Gaggero and Piga (2011) look at several intertemporal
price dispersion measures, but do not explore how these compare against other dimensions of dispersion and
do not consider any of the dynamic pricing analysis which is at the core of our contribution.
6Outside the airline industry, Leslie (2004) and Courty and Pagliero (2012) have recently assessed
intertemporal price discrimination in the market for Broadway theater and concert tickets. Similarly, Nair
(2007) and Hendel and Nevo (2013) have recently explored intertemporal price discrimination for storable
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and Williams (2013) have recently used structural models to quantify the effects of price
discrimination in monopoly markets, but do not consider changes in the market structure.
At a methodological level, our reduced form identification approach is more closely related
to Escobari (2012), who explores how prices adjust to demand shocks, and to Escobari,
Rupp and Meskey (2013), who study price-discrimination between bookings in business hours
versus bookings in the evening. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper which
investigates empirically how pricing dynamics vary with the competitive environment.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some theoretical background to fix
ideas. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 estimates the pricing dynamics and how they
vary with the competitive environment. Section 5 introduces our customer heterogeneity
measures and investigates the potential role of price discrimination. Section 6 explores how
intertemporal price dispersion compares to various alternative dispersion categories. Section 7
explores the explanatory power of systematic pricing dynamics relative to idiosyncratic
fluctuations, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Theoretical backdrop
Our exploration of the data is guided by the following hypotheses:
1. Airline ticket prices increase as the scheduled departure date approaches. We would
expect to observe such a pattern if airlines price discriminate against late-arriving
customers. Here the idea is that late-arriving customers are on average less price-elastic,
reflecting, e.g., a high preference for traveling with a particular airline or at a particular
time. Early customers on the other hand have longer planning horizons and may be
more flexible regarding their choice of time or even destination.
2. The increase in ticket prices should be less pronounced on markets that are subject to
considerable competition. The ability of airlines to exploit intertemporal differences in
consumer preferences is restrained by competition. Accordingly, we expect increases
in prices over time to be largest for monopoly markets, and less pronounced in more
competitive environments.
3. The disciplining role of competition matters most in markets where the intertemporal
customer heterogeneity is high. When there are no meaningful differences between
customers who book their flights early and customers who book their flights late, the
impact of competition on the intertemporal slope in prices should be small as well.
goods (video games and beverages, respectively).
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In Appendix A, we provide a simple theoretical model that is based on Borenstein (1985)
and generates these predictions. The model is based on the assumption that airlines offer
differentiated goods (e.g., because flights differ with respect to the scheduled departure time,
or because of certain brand preferences) and compete in prices on an early and a late market.
However, the basic intuition can also be conveyed by considering firms that offer an
undifferentiated product and compete in quantities. Suppose there are N airlines, which
compete in two distinct oligopoly markets: an “early” market E and a “late” market L. For
simplicity, suppose airlines are fully symmetric and compete in quantities. In the standard
Cournot equilibrium, the equilibrium markup in market t ∈ {E,L} is given by
Pt −mc
Pt
=
1
Nt
, (1)
where mc are marginal costs, Pt is the equilibrium price, and t ≡ −∂ logQt/∂ logPt is
the market elasticity of demand. Precisely the same relation holds in the above-described
differentiated goods environment that we explore in Appendix A.
The key feature both in the Cournot equilibrium and in the differentiated goods model in
the appendix is that from the perspective of each airline, the firm-specific elasticity of demand,
Nt, increases in the number of competitors N , reflecting the usual logic that customers
have more options to substitute across airlines when N is large. To fix ideas, suppose N is
sufficiently large, so log (1− 1/(N)) ≈ −1/(N). Then from (1), the “intertemporal slope”
can be expressed as:
log
(
PL
PE
)
≈ 1
N
(
1
L
− 1
E
)
. (2)
Using relation (2) we can easily derive the three predictions formulated above: (1) If late
customers are less price-elastic than early customers, L < E, airlines charge higher prices in
the late market than in the early market.7 (2) Due to the disciplining role of competition, the
slope is decreasing in N .8 (3) The impact of N on the slope disappears when E − L is small.
To keep the above illustration simple, we have focused on a stylized setting with third
degree price discrimination where the time at which consumers want to buy tickets is
exogenously given and is correlated with their price elasticity (e.g. because price-inelastic
business travelers generally book tickets at short notice). Alternatively, one could also think
of a time-varying price-elasticity as the result of second-degree price discrimination where
7Clearly there could be other factors, such as an increase in marginal opportunity costs, that also contribute
to an increasing price schedule. Indeed our empirical findings suggest that even for very competitive markets
the intertemporal slope does not approach zero as suggested by equation (2).
8Here we implicitly treat elasticities as constant, but the conclusion is more general. Appendix A
demonstrates this for the differentiated goods case where elasticities are proportional in prices.
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customers vary with respect to their price-sensitivity and endogenously sort with respect
to the time at which they buy tickets in advance. Clearly, this requires airlines to set an
increasing price-schedule to induce the most price-sensitive customers to buy early, giving
rise to similar predictions.9
3 Data
We use a hand-collected panel dataset containing airline ticket prices on 92 intra-European
routes and 41 distinct travel dates, where for each route-date pair we record a time series of
prices ranging from 10 weeks to 1 day prior to departure. Figures 1 provides an overview
over the cross-section of routes; details on the selection process and a full list can be found
in Appendix B. Our dataset covers virtually all direct flights offered by traditional airlines
on these routes, as well as most low cost carriers. We exclude indirect flights, as on intra-
European routes these are arguably no close substitutes to direct flights. Prices are recorded
for flights taking off between October 31, 2010 and March 26, 2011, which defines the
2010/2011 European winter flight schedule.10 Within that period, we record prices for all
flights leaving on Friday and returning on Sunday, as well as for all flights leaving on Monday
and returning on Thursday. All recorded prices are for return tickets.11 This gives us two
route-date pairs per route and week in our sample and 41 travel dates per route (uniquely
defined by the date of the outbound flight). We refer to these route-date pairs as “markets”.
For each market, we record flights and prices once a week, starting 10 weeks prior to
the travel date. In the last week prior to departure, prices are recorded on a daily basis to
account for an increased frequency of price changes. Hence, we obtain up to 17 different
prices for each physical flight.
In what follows, we will use the term “itinerary” to refer to a specific roundtrip itinerary,
characterized by the combination of outbound and return flight identification numbers.12
9For instance, suppose customers vary with respect to the intensity of their preferences over destinations
and/or travel dates, but only learn what is their most preferred destination or travel date shortly before
departure. From the perspective of a monopolist serving a particular route, customers with weak destination
preferences are more price-elastic, and the monopolist has an incentive to offer them lower prices. By
selling discounted tickets only on the early market, the monopolist can ensure that customers with stronger
preferences for a particular destination (and a lower elasticity of demand) do not buy tickets at discounted
prices and prefer to wait until they have learned their most preferred destination. A model with similar
features is discussed by Dana (1998).
10Flight schedules and routings within Europe are typicallyplanned on a semiannual basis. Within these
periods, routings and most flight characteristics do not typically vary.
11We chose to focus on return tickets, since some European airlines still discriminate strongly against the
purchase of one-way tickets. While the adoption (and recent abandoning) of such discrimination schemes
poses interesting questions by itself, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
12For each route, the direction of the outbound flight is randomly selected, so that for each city pair one of
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Figure 1: Map of routes
For example, in our terminology one “itinerary” on the route Paris–London would be using
flight number BA 333 on the outbound flight and flight number BA 334 on the return flight.
We reserve the term “flight” for the combination of an itinerary and a specific travel date.
For each flight we record the cheapest available fare, treating code-sharing flights as distinct
flights unless the involved airlines are affiliated through equity (see below).13
Overall we have data on 3762 out of 3772 distinct markets (41 travel dates times 92
routes).14 Each market averages 377 prices that are recorded over up to 17 different dates
the two cities is the origin of the outbound flight, whereas the other one is the origin of the return flight.
13The reasoning behind this choice is that in so-called “block space” codeshare agreements, each code-
sharing parter is typically granted an ex ante fixed amount of seats with considerable freedom to set prices
independently. In line with that, prices in our data differ substantially across different codesharers: The
median standard deviation among tickets sold at the same day for the same physical flight across different
codesharers is 60.13 Euros. See Appendix C.1, and in particular Footnote 46, for details and further discussion,
and for a robustness exercise where we only consider the cheapest available fare for a given physical flight
and all its codesharing offers.
14Of the ten remaining markets, seven are “missing” on the route Brussels–Leeds, where we did not find
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Figure 2: Average prices (in Euros) as a function of time remaining until departure
prior to departure for an average of 41.9 flights (i.e., roundtrip combinations) per market. In
total, our data set consists of 1.42 million individual prices (92 routes times 41 travel dates
times 377 recorded prices per market). Routes are on average 560 miles long and connect
metropolitan areas with an average of 3.9 million inhabitants. The share of domestic routes
in our sample is roughly 13 percent (12 out of 92 routes).
Prices constitute offers by a leading online booking website for airline ticket purchases,
which accounts for a major share of bookings on the European market.15 The recorded
prices in our sample range from 27 to 2581 Euros, with a weekly average of 364 Euros and a
standard deviation of 466. Figure 2 relates the observed prices to the time remaining until
departure. Prices increase from an average of 327 Euros ten weeks prior to departure to more
than 500 Euros within the last week before departure.
To investigate the impact of competition on the observed pricing dynamics, we use the
number of airlines that compete in a given market as our baseline measure of competition.16
Thereby we treat airlines that are affiliated to each other as single competitors.17 An airline
is matched to an affiliate group if that group owns more than 25% of the airline’s equity
(see Appendix B for details). Table 1 summarizes the resulting distribution of competitors.
Alternative competition measures are explored in Appendix C.
any flights offered on seven travel dates; the other three markets are missing on the routes Bordeaux–Madrid,
Moscow–Budapest and Stockholm–Berlin. While we can not entirely rule out sampling errors, these “missing”
markets are likely to be caused by exceptional changes in the flight schedule that result in certain itineraries
not being offered for the entire duration of the winter flight schedule.
15The data is collected by monitoring prices on a daily basis.
16In 7.9 percent of our sample, the number of airlines offering services on the outbound leg differs from the
number of airlines offering services on the return leg. This may, e.g., be the case if an airline does not offer
services on every day of the week. In these cases, we set competition to the rounded up mean.
17This is in line with the observed pricing patterns, which show a median ijtd-dispersion of prices within
affiliate groups of 0 Euros which starkly contrast with a median dispersion of codesharing prices for the same
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Table 1: Competition in the sample
Prices Markets
Competing airlines Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
1 229 218 16.17 905 24.06
2 648 371 45.74 1696 45.08
3 275 680 19.45 656 17.44
4 185 051 13.05 382 10.15
5 68 237 4.81 107 2.84
6 11 078 0.78 16 0.43
4 Estimation of pricing dynamics
We begin our analysis by estimating the intertemporal slope of prices and its sensitivity
to competition. Exploiting the within-flight time series structure of our data, our baseline
empirical model estimates the intertemporal slope of log prices using only the intertemporal
variations of prices within flights. All variations in prices that are route, time or itinerary-
specific are absorbed by fixed effects specified for the travel date, the date of the price offer,
and both the outbound and return itinerary (using flight numbers as identifiers). Section 4.2
generalizes our baseline setup to allow for nonlinear pricing dynamics and Appendix C
provides some robustness analysis for alternative competition measures.
4.1 Baseline specification
Let Priceijtd denote the price for a round trip that involves the outbound itinerary i and the
return itinerary j (both identified by their flight numbers), for which the outbound flight
departs at date t, and which is offered for sale at date d. Further, let Compijt denote a vector
of dummy variables that covers all competition categories, and let Dayslefttd denote the
difference between t and d in days. As a baseline, we estimate the following equation:
ln(Priceijtd) = (α + βDayslefttd)× Compijt + λi + µj + νt + ξd + εijtd, (3)
where we treat λi, µj, νt, and ξd as fixed effects.
18 Here, α is a vector of competition-specific
constants and β is the relevant coefficient-vector on the interaction term Compijt×Dayslefttd.
Note that λi and µj both nest a complete set of route specific fixed effects since any flight
physical flight across affiliate groups of 60.13 Euros.
18Because our sampling is weekly for all but the last week before departure, a daily specification of fixed
effects for d would completely absorb all last week effects of Dayslefttd; ξd is therefore modeled on a weekly
level.
9
Table 2: Baseline estimation of intertemporal slopes
Coefficients Clustered Std. Errors
(Compijt = 1)×Dayslefttd -1.31 0.09
(Compijt = 2)×Dayslefttd -1.19 0.09
(Compijt = 3)×Dayslefttd -1.15 0.09
(Compijt = 4)×Dayslefttd -1.07 0.09
(Compijt = 5)×Dayslefttd -0.93 0.10
(Compijt = 6)×Dayslefttd -0.68 0.12
Observations 1 417 635
R-squared (adj.) 0.58
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(Priceijtd). Unreported but included in the estimation are levels of
Compijt and fixed effects λi, µj , νt and ξd. Reported coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100.
Standard errors are clustered at the market level. All reported coefficients are significant at the 0.1 percent
level.
number uniquely pins down the corresponding city-pair. Together the specified set of fixed
effects absorbs all itinerary-related effects such as departure time or length of flight; all
route characteristics such as connected cities or alternative means of transportation; and all
time-related effects such as travel dates, and dates of price offer.
The impact of competition on the observed pricing dynamics is captured by our estimates
of β. Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients. Our estimates for the corresponding standard
errors are adjusted for clustering at the market level. All reported coefficients are economically
and statistically significant (at any reasonable level).19
It can be seen that for all competition categories prices increase as the scheduled travel
date approaches, but that the intertemporal slope decreases substantially in the number of
competitors. While in monopoly markets prices increase by an average of 1.31 percent with
every day that a customer waits to book, this slope is reduced to 1.19 percent in duopoly
markets and 0.93 percent in markets with 5 competitors.
These results are consistent with the idea that airlines operating in competitive markets
are restrained in their ability to price-discriminate, leading to less intertemporal variation
in prices. Section 5 explores this possibility further using hotel bookings data to proxy for
variations in customer heterogeneity in an effort to make this argument more rigorous.
A potential concern may be that competition is possibly endogenous. To the extend that
our route fixed effects control for the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on average prices, we
only need to worry about heterogeneity that affects prices differentially across purchase dates.
19The (unreported) competition-specific constants are only weakly identified in our sample by variations
across travel dates but within routes since competition typically does not vary within routes for a given
flight schedule. With this qualification in mind, we observe a hump-shaped relation between price levels and
competition, peaking at three competitors.
10
While we cannot fully rule out the existence of such factors, we consider it likely that they
are of second order compared to the direct impact of competition on pricing dynamics.20
4.2 Nonlinear advanced purchase discounts
Our baseline estimation imposes the assumption that log prices depend linearly on Dayslefttd.
Since this is likely not to be the case, we now generalize our baseline model to allow for
nonlinear pricing dynamics. To this end, we use the same model as above, but replace
Dayslefttd by a vector of dummy variables covering all values of Dayslefttd, hence imposing
virtually no parametric restrictions on the evolution of prices over time. Our empirical model
can be written as:
ln(Priceijtd) = φ(Dayslefttd, Compijt) + λi + µj + νt + ξd + εijtd, (4)
where φ : {1, . . . , 74} × {1, . . . , 6} → R is an arbitrary function determined by the data.
The resulting nonlinear relationships are summarized in Figure 3 (see Figure 9 in the
appendix for confidence bands). In the figure, we normalize φ such that for each Compijt the
average log price r days before takeoff is set to zero.21 The numbers on the y-axis report
ln
(
pijtd
pijtd|d=t−r
)
× 100,
which approximately amounts to the difference in prices between date t and date r, expressed
in percent of the price charged r days before departure.
In the left panel, we set r = 1. The y-axis thus approximately reflects the estimated
advanced purchase discount relative to the price charged one day before departure. It can be
seen that, although nonlinear, the slopes are again monotonically decreasing in the number
of competitors. Accordingly, the relative discount for booking a flight in advance is less
pronounced on routes that are served by a larger number of competitors, reinstating the
conclusion drawn from our baseline estimation.
Taking a closer look at the identified pricing dynamics, it can further be seen that prices
20One potential concern might be that routes with more scope for price discrimination are more profitable
and attract more competitors. If this is the case, then we would expect to see a positive correlation between
competition and customer heterogeneity. Yet, as evident from Figures 4 and 5 below, the correlation is
essentially zero for all 8 proxies for customer heterogeneity considered in this paper. Moreover, to the extend
that such a correlation would predict a positive link between competition and the intertemporal slope, we
would then underestimate the effect of competition on the intertemporal slope, suggesting that the estimated
degree of intertemporal price discrimination in fact constitutes a lower bound.
21As before, we again scale all coefficients by 100. The displayed relations are hence given by {φ(x, y)−
φ(r, y)} × 100.
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Figure 3: Nonlinear estimation of pricing dynamics.
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Priceijtd). Coefficients are multiplied by 100 and are normalized relative to
the prices 1 day (left panel) and 38 days (right panel) before takeoff. Accordingly, the reported estimates
approximately correspond to percentage price changes relative to the reported reference points. The estimation
controls for levels of Compijt and fixed effects λi, µj , νt and ξd.
are increasing at similar slopes until about five weeks before takeoff. Only in the last five
weeks, prices in less competitive routes have a significantly steeper slope than prices in more
competitive routes. To illustrate this further, we set r = 38 in the right panel. Until about
five weeks before takeoff log prices increase virtually along a single line across all competitive
environments, showing an increase of about 0.45 percent for each day a customer waits to
book. This translates into an overall discount of approximately 16 percent for purchasing
tickets ten weeks before departure compared to five weeks before departure.
Starting about five weeks before departure, prices increase significantly faster, with prices
on the least competitive environments increasing the fastest. On monopoly routes, customers
pay a premium of 95.09 percent for purchasing their ticket a day before takeoff rather than
five weeks in advance (the intercept with the y-axis on the right). This premium is reduced
to 81.70 percent in duopoly markets, and is further reduced to 77.16 percent in markets with
three competitors, 72.81 percent in markets with four competitors, 59.84 percent in markets
with 5 competitors, and 50.83 percent in markets with 6 competitors. With the exception of
a few adjacent competition pairings, these premiums are all significantly different from one
12
another at the 5 percent level.22
In sum, the nonlinear estimation reinforces the clear pattern of dynamic oligopoly pricing
revealed by our baseline specification: While airlines offer substantial advanced purchase
discounts across all market structures, the magnitude of these discounts is highly sensitive to
competition, suggesting that airlines operating in competitive markets are restrained in their
ability to price-discriminate. The next section explores this possibility in more detail.
5 Intertemporal price discrimination
We now turn to the question whether price discrimination can explain the pricing dynamics
identified in this paper. Above we have already argued that the observed “flattening” of the
intertemporal slope for more competitive routes is in line with airlines being more restrained
in their ability to price-discriminate. In this section, we construct a number of proxies for
the heterogeneity in the customer base in a given market in an effort to make this argument
more rigorous.
Following our argumentation in Section 2, the idea is that the degree to which an airline’s
ability to price-discriminate becomes restrained in more competitive markets should depend
on how much it would discriminate among customers if it were unconstrained (i.e., in a
monopoly). In the extreme case where customers are completely homogeneous, we would not
expect any price discrimination even in monopoly markets. Accordingly, if price discrimination
is the driver behind the observed pricing dynamics, then competition should have less of an
impact on the intertemporal slope in more homogenous markets.
5.1 Customer heterogeneity measures
In the airline industry the co-existence between tourists (and other leisure travelers) and
business customers is arguably the largest source of heterogeneity in the customer base. Our
approach to evaluating customer heterogeneity is therefore aimed at measuring the tourist
intensity in a given market. In particular, we use Eurostat data on hotel bookings to construct
two heterogeneity measures that are likely to be positively correlated with tourist intensity.
In Appendix C, we consider six alternative measures, including dummies for Saturday-night
stay-overs, holiday seasons, as well as temperature and precipitation differentials. The results
22Specifically, the premiums charged on the day before takeoff relative to five weeks in advance are
statistically different at the 1 percent level between all competition pairings, except for 2 vs 4 where the
difference is statistically different at the 5 percent level and for 2 vs 3, 3 vs 4 and 5 vs 6 where we cannot
reject equality at the 10 percent level. See Figure 9 in the appendix for confidence bands about the entire
price schedules.
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Figure 4: Summary of tourist intensity measures.
Notes: Means and ±1 standard deviation bands are indicated by the circled dots and boxes. Supports are
indicated by the extending lines.
are surprisingly similar across all these measures. To streamline the exposition, we focus on
the most direct measures of tourist intensity in the main text.
Our first measure (Durationij) computes the average number of nights per visit booked
in hotels and similar residencies at the destination.23 Here the idea is that the average
duration of a given booking is larger for tourists, so that small values of Durationij are
likely to reflect a high fraction of business travelers, whereas high values should reflect a
larger share of tourists. Our second measure (Intensityij) is defined as the number of nights
booked in hotels and similar residencies relative to the population at the destination (in
thousands), capturing instead the intensity of the tourist industry at the destination. In line
with this intuition, both measures are largest in pro-typical tourist locations such as Mallorca
(Durationij = 33.4 nights, Intensityij = 59.0) and Innsbruck (24.3, 47.2), and smallest in
locations that are unlikely tourist locations such as Leeds (2.1, 1.4), Manchester (2.6, 1.8), or
Duesseldorf (2.2, 1.9).
To give an overview over these measures, Figure 4 plots their means (marked by the circled
dots), standard deviation bands (marked by the boxes), and supports (marked by the lines)
conditional on the number of competitors. It can be seen that the variation across competition
categories is small relative to the within-category standard deviation and supports. This
suggests that the competition effect that we have identified above are not merely driven by a
correlation between customer heterogeneity and competition.24
23The measure is computed using 2011 Eurostat data at the NUTS-2 level. For large cities the NUTS-2
level typically coincides with the city level (e.g., Berlin, Lisbon or Prague), while smaller cities or less densely
populated areas are typically clustered into urban areas or regions (e.g., Manchester into Greater Manchester
or Aberdeen into North Eastern Scotland).
24More formally, the correlation coefficients are below 0.04 in absolute terms and are not statistical different
14
Naturally, one would expect that the scope for price discrimination is positively correlated
with the customer heterogeneity on a given route. In order to identify whether our measures
for tourist intensity are positively or negatively linked to customer heterogeneity (and hence
to the scope for price discrimination), we look at their impact on the intertemporal slope
on monopoly routes (see below for more details).25 As it turns out, both Durationij and
Intensityij have a positive impact on the intertemporal slope in monopoly routes. Accordingly,
we interpret increases in either measure as increases in customer heterogeneity. Note that this
does not mechanically imply our results below, as those are about the interaction between
customer heterogeneity and competition. As a robustness check we also include a specification
that allows for non-monotonic effects of tourist intensity on customer heterogeneity (see
Appendix C.3).
5.2 Impact of customer heterogeneity on pricing dynamics
To investigate how changes in customer heterogeneity affect the sensitivity of the intertemporal
slope to competition, we estimate the following model:
ln(Priceijtd) = (α + βDayslefttd)×Xijt + λi + µj + νt + ξd + ijtd, (5)
with
Xijt = (1, Nijt, Hetij, Nijt ×Hetij),
where Nijt is the number of competitors
26, Hetij is the customer heterogeneity measure,
and λi , µj , νt and ξd are treated as fixed effects. To facilitate the discussion below, we
normalize Hetij to have zero mean and unit variance. Here β is the relevant vector of “slope”
coefficients that define the intertemporal slope. Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients and
standard errors (clustered at the market level). From Panel (a) it can be seen that in line
with our baseline estimation, the coefficients for Dayslefttd are negative (and large) in both
specifications, whereas the coefficients for Dayslefttd ×Nijt are positive. Accordingly, in line
with our baseline model, prices are again unambiguously increasing as the scheduled travel
date approaches, and the intertemporal slope “flattens” in more competitive environments.
from zero at the 1 percent level. Testing pairwise for difference in means between all 15 competition pairings
for each measure, the data rejects any difference in 80 percent of the cases for Durationij and in 67 percent
of the cases for Intensityij .
25In general, we would expect customer heterogeneity to increase in tourist intensity if the share of leisure
travelers is unconditionally low, and decrease if it is unconditionally high.
26See Appendix C for a competition-specific treatment of customer heterogeneity. In sum, we do not
find much evidence for non-linear effects of Nijt. Accordingly, our conclusions are both qualitatively and
quantitatively akin to the linear case. In an effort to streamline the following exposition, we hence focus on a
linear model in this section and confine the competition-specific setting to the appendix.
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Table 3: Competition, customer heterogeneity, and pricing dynamics
(1) (2)
Customer Heterogeneity Measure: Durationij Intensityij
(a) Estimated Slope Coefficients
Dayslefttd −1.41 −1.37
(0.10) (0.10)
Dayslefttd ×Nijt 0.07 0.08
(0.01) (0.01)
Dayslefttd ×Hetij −0.13 −0.16
(0.02) (0.02)
Dayslefttd ×Nijt ×Hetij 0.06 0.08
(0.01) (0.01)
(b) Sensitivity and Overall Slope
Low heterogeneity markets
sensitivity to competition 0.01 −0.01
implied monopoly slope −1.27 −1.22
implied competitive slope (Nijt = 5) −1.23 −1.24
High heterogeneity markets
sensitivity to competition 0.13 0.16
implied monopoly slope −1.42 −1.38
implied competitive slope (Nijt = 5) −0.90 −0.76
Observations 1 255 125 1 286 687
R-squared (adj.) 0.57 0.57
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(Priceijtd). Unreported but included in the estimations are levels of
Dayslefttd, Nijt, Hetij and Nijt ×Hetij , and fixed effects λi, µj , νt and ξd. The variable used for Hetij is
indicated at the top of each column. Hetij is transformed to have zero mean and unit variance. Clustered
standard errors (at the market level) are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients and standard errors are
multiplied by 100. All reported coefficients are significant at the 0.1 percent level. Low and high heterogeneity
markets in Panel (b) are defined as markets with Hetij = ±1 standard deviation relative to the mean.
Number of observations depends on availability of heterogeneity data.
Quantitatively, the identified competition effects are similar to our baseline model. Given
that Hetij has a zero mean and is largely uncorrelated with Nijt this should not come as
a surprise. Still, we find that customer heterogeneity has an important effect on pricing
dynamics. The coefficients for Dayslefttd ×Hetij, are about twice the size of the ones for
Dayslefttd ×Nijt, meaning that a one standard deviation change in customer heterogeneity
has an impact on the intertemporal slope that is comparable to the effect of two additional
competitors.
We now discuss our main result regarding how customer heterogeneity affects the impact
of competition on the intertemporal slope. As discussed above, we interpret a change in
Hetij that steepens the intertemporal slope in monopoly markets as an increase in customer
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heterogeneity. This is based on the presumption that increases in the customer heterogeneity
should steepen the intertemporal slope when airlines are unconstrained in their ability to
price-discriminate. Given our empirical model, Hetij steepens the slope in monopolies if
∂2 ln(Priceijtd)
∂Dayslefttd ∂Hetij
∣∣∣∣
Nijt=1
= βHet + βN×Het < 0,
where we use βHet and βN×Het to refer to the estimated slope coefficients for Hetij and
Nijt ×Hetij in model (5). From the estimated coefficients, we can see that this is the case
for both our measures, suggesting that Hetij increases customer heterogeneity.
27
With this interpretation at hand, we are now ready to explore the main question: Does
the sensitivity of the slope to competition increase in customer heterogeneity as it should
when price discrimination is the major source behind the observed pricing dynamics? Looking
at the estimated slope coefficients of Nijt ×Hetij, it turns out that this is indeed the case:
The estimated slope coefficient of Nijt ×Hetij is statistically significant and positive in both
specifications. Note that this result is not mechanically caused by our strategy to identify
what causes an increase in customer heterogeneity.28
To assess the economic significance of this heterogeneity-caused variation in the sensitivity
to competition, we use the estimated model to compute the sensitivity for values of Hetij
at one standard deviation above and below its mean (meant to indicate markets with high
and low customer heterogeneities, respectively). Exploiting the fact that we have normalized
Hetij to have zero mean and unit variance, these sensitivities are given by
∂2 ln(Price)
∂Dayslefttd ∂Nijt
∣∣∣∣
Hetij=±1
= βN ± βN×Het.
Panel (b) of Table 3 reports the computed sensitivities and the implied overall slope.
Driving down the heterogeneity to one standard deviation below its mean virtually shuts
down the sensitivity of the intertemporal slope to competition. This is consistent with the
idea that in the absence of customer heterogeneity airlines do not discriminate much to begin
with and, hence, they are also not getting restrained in their ability to price-discriminate
when competition intensifies. Conversely, in high heterogeneity markets the slope of prices is
27A may be worried that changes in the tourist intensity may have a non-monotonic impact on customer
heterogeneity. For instance, while heterogeneity is increasing in Hetij on most routes, it may be decreasing in
Hetij on routes that are already characterized by a large number of leisure travelers. We explore this concern
in Appendix C using a quadratic specification in Hetij , but do not find any evidence for non-monotonicity.
28To the contrary, if it were not for the negative sign of βHet, our strategy would lead us to interpret
βN×Het > 0 as a reduction in customer heterogeneity so that we would mechanically reject the working
hypothesis that competition has a larger impact in more heterogeneous markets. In that sense, our strategy
is in fact biased against the results that we are finding.
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highly sensitive to changes in competition. Here, an increase in competition “flattens” the
intertemporal slope by between 0.13 and 0.16 percentage points per day.
To illustrate the magnitude of these effects, let us consider what this implies for the
difference between a route that is served by a monopolist and a route that is served by five
competitors. While in low heterogeneity markets the difference in the intertemporal slope
between monopolies and competitive markets with Nijt = 5 amounts to only 0.04 percentage
points per day, the gap rises to 0.52 percentage points per day in high heterogeneity markets.
We interpret the difference between these numbers as being likely to be caused by price
discrimination. Compared to the overall slope in markets with Nijt = 5, this gap amounts to
nearly a doubling of the intertemporal slope, suggesting that intertemporal price discrimination
is an important driver of the dynamic oligopoly pricing patterns that we have identified in
this paper.
6 Decomposing price dispersion
In an attempt to reconcile our study of pricing dynamics with the empirical price dispersion
literature, we now construct a measure of intertemporal price dispersion and contrast it with
more broadly defined dispersion measures used by the previous literature.
Due to limitations in the available data, the empirical price dispersion literature has
so far focused on dispersion measures for airfares that do not disentangle intertemporal
dispersion within flights from the dispersion in prices across different flights (pooling both,
different itineraries and different travel dates). Different studies have thereby reached different
conclusions regarding the relation between competition and these dispersion measures, ranging
from positive (Borenstein and Rose, 1994), over no clear relation (Hayes and Ross, 1998), to
negative (Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009).
We use the various dimensions of our panel to distinguish the impact of competition on
intertemporal price dispersion for a given flight from its impact on various types of cross-flight
dispersion. Following the literature, we use the Gini coefficient to measure the dispersion
within a given set of prices. Intuitively, the Gini coefficient corresponds to half the expected
price difference in terms of the average price. A Gini coefficient of 0.10 would accordingly
represent an expected absolute difference between two randomly selected prices of 20 percent
of the average price.29
Panel (a) of Table 4 summarizes the average Gini coefficients in our data set. Column 1
29To make the Gini coefficients comparable to the previous literature, we compute all Gini coefficients
after up-sampling observations with more than seven days left to departure in order to compensate for the
increased sampling frequency in the last week.
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reports the average price dispersion across all flights (and dates of ticket offers) offered by a
given competitor on a given route. As in the previous literature, this pools together different
itineraries (within the same route) and different flights across different travel dates. We find
an average dispersion of 64 percent of the average offer.30 Column 4 shows in contrast the
intertemporal dispersion within a given flight (defined by a particular itinerary at a particular
travel date). We see that the intertemporal dispersion is substantially smaller (24 percent).
The two intermediate cases where we pool flights only across itineraries (within markets)
or only across travel dates (within itineraries) are reported in Columns 2 and 3. As expected,
pooling along either dimension increases the dispersion relative to Column 4. The increase
in dispersion due to differences in flight characteristics (e.g., departure time) appears to be
higher than the dispersion due to different travel date characteristics (e.g., flights departing
on Monday versus flights departing on Friday).
In the following we explore the relation between competition and the different dispersion
measures. We do no longer include itinerary specific fixed effects, since these would absorb
any dispersion on the itinerary and route level. Instead we include a large number of control
variables Xijt that were previously nested into λi and µj .
31 Moreover, since the Gini coefficient
is bounded between zero and one, we follow the previous literature and transform it into an
unbounded statistic, using instead the Gini log-odds ratio Gloddijt = ln[Gijt/(1−Gijt)].
We estimate the following empirical model:
Gloddijt = α + β ×Nijt + γ ×Xijt + νt + ξd + ijt, (6)
where Nijt is the number of competitors
32, Xijt contains our set of controls, and νt and ξd
are vectors of fixed effects for the travel date and the date of the price offer. The estimated
coefficients are reported in Panel (b) of Table 4. All reported coefficients are significant at
the 0.1 percent level (using standard errors that are clustered at the market level).
In line with the pricing dynamics identified above, competition has a negative impact
on the intertemporal price dispersion (Column 4).33 However, once we consider broader
measures of price dispersion this effect is diluted (Column 3) or even overturned (Columns 1
30Since the within-route dispersion is strongly right-skewed in our sample, the median dispersion is somewhat
smaller, evaluating to 56 percent of the average offer.
31Specifically, Xijt includes a full set of dummies for the departure city, destination city, and the time of
the day of the outgoing and returning itineraries (at an hourly level); as well as measures for the market
size, share, and symmetry; GDP and weather data of the connected cities; the weekday and length of the
itineraries; holidays; and the tourist intensity in a given market (see Section 5 for a detailed presentation of
these measures).
32Using the number of competitors Nijt instead of a vector of dummy variables allows us to compare the
impact of competition on the different dispersion measures in a straightforward way.
33See also, Gaggero and Piga (2011).
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and 2). A potential explanation is that in more competitive environments, airlines offer a
larger number of connections to compete in departure dates and times, and that there is a
meaningful dispersion of prices across these connections.34
In sum, while we find an unambiguously negative impact of competition on intertemporal
price dispersion, once we include cross-flight dispersion the impact depends on the precise
definition of the dispersion measure. This suggest that the seemingly contradicting findings
in the earlier literature may be driven by confounding different dimensions of dispersion.
However, given that the datasets used in the various studies differ across a number of
dimensions the differences between their results could also be influenced by other factors.
7 Stochastic pricing dynamics
This section analyzes the relevance of the systematic pricing dynamics identified in Sections 4
and 5 relative to other sources of intertemporal price dispersion. While we do not attempt to
explain these residual components, an obvious source consistent with the residual variations
documented below are random demand fluctuations that cause airlines to dynamically adjust
their prices.35
7.1 Systematic vs. unsystematic pricing dynamics
We start by asking how much of the intertemporal dispersion documented in the last section
is due to the systematic advanced purchase discounts documented in Section 4 (instead of
random price fluctuations). To answer this question, we use our estimates of the baseline
model (3) and of the nonlinear model (4) to project samples of counterfactual price data in
which the intertemporal variation in prices is fully determined by the identified intertemporal
slopes. For these samples, we then compute the intertemporal dispersion on the flight level.
We refer to this as the “systematic dispersion” implied by the estimated pricing dynamics.
Columns 5 and 6 of Panel (a) in Table 4 report these intertemporal price dispersion measures
in the two samples.
It can be seen that for the average flight the within-flight price dispersion projected from
34The positive relation between competition and cross-flight dispersion is also consistent with theoretical
explorations by Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989), who have shown that the dispersion across flights may
increase in competition when consumers’ cross-price elasticities between different airlines is lower than the
elasticity of industry demand.
35See, for instance, Alderighi, Nicolini and Piga (2012), Williams (2013), and Puller, Sengupta and Wiggins
(2015). On the theory side, on particular channel why random demand fluctuations may cause variations
in pricing dynamics in ex ante identical markets is modeled by the peak-load pricing literature (Gale and
Holmes, 1992, 1993; Dana, 1998, 1999a,b, 2001).
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our baseline estimation (Columns 5 and 6) closely resembles the one in the data.36 Based on
the nonlinear estimation, 83 percent of the within-flight dispersion of the average flight (0.10
out of 0.12) can be attributed to the identified pricing dynamics seen in Figure 3. Systematic
advanced purchase discounts therefore seem to be the major source of within-flight price
dispersion, as opposed to unsystematic volatility around the trend.37
We also use the projected price data to relate the (projected) Gini coefficient to the
number of competitors. Using exactly the same specification as in the previous section, we
find that the impact of competition on the dispersion that is due to systematic advanced
purchase discounts is slightly higher (in absolute terms) than the impact on its empirical
counterpart (Columns 5 and 6 in Panel (b) of Table 4 compared to Column 4). This suggests
that the impact of competition on price dispersion is mainly driven by its impact on the
intertemporal slope rather than changes in random fluctuations over time.38
7.2 Systematic vs. unsystematic variations in pricing dynamics
Given that systematically increasing prices appear to account for a large share of the price
dispersion on the average flight, we now address the related issue of how much of the variation
in pricing dynamics across markets can be explained by the factors discussed above. In
particular, we are interested in the combined explanatory power of competition and customer
heterogeneity.39
We proceed in two stages. In stage 1, we split our data into 3762 market-specific sub-
samples, defined by the combination of a route r and a travel date t. In each of these market
36The difference between the two estimations is likely due to the increased sampling frequency in the last
week before departure. Because prices are generally increasing at a steeper slope during that period, the
sample-average slope exceeds the time-average in our sample. Projecting the sample-average slope throughout
the ten week horizon does therefore overestimate the contribution of systematic advanced purchase discounts
relative to unsystematic volatility. This bias vanishes, once we allow slopes to vary with the time left until
departure, as we do in the projection based on our nonlinear estimation.
37Because the intertemporal slope maps nonlinearly to the projected Gini, our estimate is not identical to
the one obtained from estimating the intertemporal slope for each flight and then using the flight-specific
estimations to project the Gini. While such an exercise would be meaningless for the nonlinear estimation
(for each flight, the identified nonlinear price path would be identical to the observed price path, so that the
resulting Gini would perfectly predict the empirical one), it is feasible for the linear estimation. Doing so, we
find a slightly higher average Gini of 0.12, suggesting that our results (slighly) underpredict the systematic
contribution of pricing dynamics compared to random price fluctuations.
38In fact, consistent with the idea that the impact of competition on the empirical dispersion is primarily
due to its impact on the systematic trend of prices to increase, the ratio of slopes 0.450.52 ≈ 0.865 is very similar
to the identified systematic dispersion share of 83 percent.
39See Figure 8 in Appendix D for a schematic illustration how this differs from the exercise in the previous
subsection.
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samples, we run the following first stage regression:
ln(Priceijtd) = αrt + SrtDayslefttd + ijtd,
where αrt and Srt are the estimated market-specific coefficients. Collecting Srt from all
regressions, this gives us a sample of market-specific intertemporal slopes.
In stage 2, we then relate the identified slopes Srt to a number of explanatory variables
Xrt in order to assess their share in explaining the observed variations in Srt. To this end,
we estimate the following relation:
Srt = α + β ×Xrt + rt, (7)
where Xrt varies across our specifications. For each specification, we use the R-squared statistic
to identify the fraction of the cross-market variations in Srt explained by Xrt. Table 5 reports
the results. In Column 1, we let Xrt = Comprt to get an idea of the cross-market variations
in the intertemporal slope that can be explained by variations in the competitive environment
alone (analogous to the patterns identified in Section 4). We find that competition accounts
for about 5 percent of the cross-market variation.
Given that our main interest lies on the share of cross-market variations explained by
intertemporal price discrimination, we next let Xrt include a number of different market-
characteristics that are likely to correlate with customer heterogeneity. Specifically, we include
both measures used in Section 5 as well as a number of further measures that we discuss
in detail in Appendix C. While individually each of these measures only captures some
variations in customer heterogeneity, our hope is that their combination spans a large part of
the actual variations in customer heterogeneity. We allow these heterogeneity measures to
interact with competition in order to capture the effects discussed in Section 5. Using this
specification, we can explain 17 percent of the variation in Srt. This suggests that in addition
to customer heterogeneity, there exist a number of unrelated factors that explain a large part
of the variations in the intertemporal slopes across markets.
To get some idea at which level these factors are likely to operate, we lastly let Xrt
include a set of route and travel date fixed effects (again interacted with Comprt). The
explanatory power of this fixed effects specification is 63 percent, providing an upper bound
on the explanatory power of any route or travel data specific characteristics. The remaining
37 percent are only explainable using factors that vary across travel dates and routes. While
it is beyond the scope of this paper to identify the source of these residual variations in the
intertemporal slope, we find it hard to reconcile them fully with any deterministic pricing
scheme. We therefore conjecture that they represent, at least in parts, the adjustments of
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prices (and, hence, measured slopes) in response to demand shocks that materialize within
the last ten weeks before departure.
8 Summary
This study documents two sources of variations of airline pricing dynamics. First, the rate
at which airline ticket prices increase as the scheduled departure date approaches is highly
sensitive to the number of airlines active in a given market. While in monopoly markets
prices increase by an average of 1.31 percent per day, this slope is reduced to 1.19 percent in
duopoly markets, and is further decreasing in competition to 0.93 percent in markets with
five competitors.
Second, this sensitivity of the intertemporal slope to competition varies substantially with
the heterogeneity among customers. With a highly heterogeneous customer base, prices on
monopoly routes increase by 0.52 percentage points per day more than prices on markets with
five competitors. Conversely, on markets with very homogenous customers, this difference is
almost zero.
These findings are consistent with intertemporal price discrimination being a major source
of the observed pricing dynamics: Competition is likely to restrain an airline’s ability to price-
discriminate, but this constraint is more relevant in markets with an highly heterogeneous
customer base where there is scope for price-discrimination in the first place.
Our results suggests that these forces are quantitatively important. Systematic advanced
purchase discounts explain about 83 percent of the total within-flight dispersion on the
average flight. Moreover, competition and customer heterogeneity explain 17 percent of the
observed variation in the intertemporal slope across markets.
These numbers suggest that while systematically increasing prices are the main source
behind intertemporal price dispersion, there are likely a number of factors alongside price
discrimination that are responsible for the observed variations in the intertemporal slope. In
particular, we find that 37 percent of the cross-market variation can only be accounted for by
factors that vary across travel dates and routes. While it is beyond the scope of this paper
to identify the source of these residual variations, we conjecture that price adjustments in
response to random demand fluctuations are likely to play an important role in explaining
these residual variations.
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A Intertemporal price discrimination in a differenti-
ated goods environment
In this appendix, we demonstrate how the relation between markups, the demand elasticity,
and competition in equation (1) can also be derived in a simple differentiated goods environ-
ment. The model is based on Borenstein (1985). Assume there are two periods, an “early”
period E and a “late” period L: t ∈ {E,L}. In each period, there is a number of different
standard Salop markets indexed by i. Each of these markets can be represented as a circle
with circumference of one.
Any firm that offers flights is assumed to be active on all markets; i.e., the number of
competitors N ≥ 2 is constant across periods and markets. Firms are indexed by j and are
located equidistantly along the circle. Firms incur a marginal cost of m when selling a ticket.
In order to focus on intertemporal price discrimination, we rule out the possibility for airlines
to discriminate intra-temporally across different markets. Formally, airlines can observe the
period in which a customer buys his ticket, but cannot distinguish between customers located
on different markets i. Hence, each airline j is restricted to offering two prices, PjE and PjL.
In each period, there is a total mass one of customers, a fraction θit of which are located
on market i. On each of these markets, consumers are uniformly distributed along the circle,
with z ∈ [0, 1] denoting a consumer’s location on the circle. Consumers have an outside
option of zero and receive a utility of Uit = Ai − Pjt − ci|z −X| when buying a ticket from
firm j, where X is the location of firm j and |z−X| is the arc distance from z to X. Different
markets differ with respect to consumer’s willingness to pay for a ticket Ai and the intensity
of their “product preferences” ci. In the context of the airline industry, one can think of ci,
for instance, as the value of flying at a particular time with a particular airline. In that sense,
we can think of different markets as consisting of different types of consumers (e.g., business
versus leisure travelers), and the distribution of consumer across types may differ in the two
periods.
We assume that Ai ∈ [A, A¯] and ci ∈ [c, c¯] and denote the distribution of ci over consumers
who buy in period t by Ft(c). In order to keep the analysis tractable and to focus on the
most interesting case, we impose two parameter restrictions. First, we assume that c is
sufficiently large such that a symmetric equilibrium exists.40 Moreover, we assume that A
is sufficiently large relative to m such that in equilibrium, all consumers purchase a ticket
and firms compete with each other for customers on all markets.41 Since, the airline industry
40A (grossly) sufficient condition for this to be the case is that c ≥ 2/3 [Et(1/ci)]−1 for all t ∈ {E,L}.
41A sufficient condition for all markets to be covered is that A > m+ 1.5c¯/N . Without this assumption,
the problem becomes highly intractable (see Borenstein, 1985 for details).
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is typically characterized by high fixed costs and low marginal costs, it seems likely that in
practice the willingness to pay Ai is indeed high relative to the marginal cost m and it is
optimal to serve all customers who are willing to buy a ticket.
The optimization problems in the two periods are independent of each other, so we can
solve them separately from each other. Assume there is a symmetric equilibrium in which all
consumers find it strictly optimal to purchase a ticket and airlines charge price Pt. Consider
the number of tickets that firm j = 1 (which is located at an arbitrary point 0 on the circle)
sells on market i in period t. The marginal customer with z ≥ 0 who buys from firm 1 must
be indifferent between buying from airline 1 or airline 2: Ai−P1t−ciz = Ai−Pt−ci(1/N−z),
or
z =
1
2
(
Pt − P1t
ci
+
1
N
)
.
Observe that firm 1 does not only serve customers located within the interval z ∈ [0, 1/N ]
but also on its other side; i.e., on [−1/N, 0]. Summing over all markets, the total amount of
customers that are served by firm 1 is therefore given by
Q1t(P1t, Pt) =
∑
i
(
Pt − P1t
ci
+
1
N
)
1
θit
.
In equilibrium, firm 1 chooses P1t in order to maximize profits
Π1t = (P1t −m)Q1t(P1t, Pt).
Imposing symmetry, the first-order condition can be written as
Pt −m
Pt
=
1
Nt
,
where t = Et{1/ci}Pt and Nt = −∂ logQ1t/ logP1t is firm 1’s elasticity of demand. Given
the constraints on Ai and ci, this is indeed an equilibrium and the symmetric equilibrium is
unique.42 That is, just as in the standard Cournot case, the firm’s elasticity of demand scales
with N and markups are given by relation (1).
In the context of the differentiated goods setting, airlines charge higher prices if customers
have stronger (and less uncertain) “product preferences”. If on average, late customers
have more intensive product preferences (e.g., because they want to travel with a specific
airline, on a specific day or at a specific time), prices increase over time.43 However, the
42More specifically, we can show that in the candidate equilibrium, all consumers do indeed find it optimal
to purchase a ticket, and that there are no non-local deviations that firms may find profitable. Finally, there
is no symmetric equilibrium in which some consumers do not buy a ticket.
43Specifically, we have that L < E whenever FL(c) has second-order stochastic dominance over FE(c).
25
extent to which firms can exploit consumers’ product preferences and set prices in excess of
their marginal costs is decreasing in competition. Hence, competition restrains the ability of
airlines to price-discriminate between customers who book their flights early and customers
who book at short notice. As a result, the increase in prices over time is less pronounced
in more competitive environments. To see this formally, rewrite the first-order condition to
get Pt = m+ 1/(N˜t) where ˜t = t/Pt = Et{1/ci} captures the exogenous variation in price
elasticities. Taking logs, we get
log
(
PL
PE
)
= log
(
˜−1L +Nm
˜−1E +Nm
)
,
which is clearly decreasing in N .
Finally, these effects become less relevant if there are no meaningful differences between
customers who book their flights early and customers who book their flights late (i.e., if E−L
is small). In this case firms would not discriminate between different types of customers in
any meaningful way even if they were unconstrained. Hence, competition has a very limited
effect.
It is worth noting that our results due not hinge on the independence of demands across
the two markets. In particular, it should be clear that given that prices increase over time,
customers that arrive early would have no incentives to postpone buying a ticket if we would
allow for such actions.
B Data construction
B.1 Routes
Our cross-section of routes is sampled from the existing connections between a set of 60
European cities with international airports. All routes are defined on the city-level. In case
there exist multiple airports within one city, we include routes to all airport combinations
(e.g., routes between London and Paris cover all offered combinations between {LCY, LGW,
LHR, LTN} and {CDG, ORY}).
The 60 cities were chosen to ensure regional variety as well as variety in the size and
importance of the residing airports. To this end, the set includes the cities with the four
largest airports in each of the EU5 countries (measured by 2009 total passenger traffic):
• France: Paris, Nice, Lyon, Marseille
• Germany: Frankfurt, Munich, Duesseldorf, Berlin
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• Italy: Rom, Milan, Venice, Catania
• Spain: Madrid, Barcelona, Palma de Mallorca, Malaga
• UK: London, Manchester, Edinburgh, Birmingham
The remaining 40 cities are selected from both the EU5 and the rest of Europe (including
Russia and Turkey): Aberdeen, Amsterdam, Athens, Belgrade, Bilbao, Bologna, Bordeaux,
Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Copenhagen, Dublin, Geneva, Hamburg, Hannover, Helsinki,
Innsbruck, Istanbul, Leeds, Leipzig, Lisbon, Liverpool, Moscow, Nantes, Naples, Nuernberg,
Oporto, Oslo, Palermo, Prague, Sofia, Stockholm, Strasbourg, Stuttgart, Toulouse, Turin,
Valencia, Vienna, Warsaw, and Zurich.
From the simplex of routes spanned by those 60 cities, we then sampled 100 random
routes, disregarding all routes for which not at least one direct daily connection was offered
at the beginning of our sampling period (October 31, 2010). To this routes, we added, if not
yet contained, the ten routes connecting the cities with the largest airports in each of the
EU5 countries (Paris, Frankfurt, Milan, Madrid, and London).
A limitation of our data source is that it does not contain prices set by Ryanair, a major
competitor in the intra-European market. To prevent our data from being affected by an
unobserved competitor, we therefore excluded all routes that were served by Ryanair within
a 40 miles (65 km) radius of the corresponding city centers. From the above city list, this
applies to all (existing) Ryanair route combinations between the following cities: Barcelona,
Birmingham, Berlin, Bologna, Bordeaux, Brussels, Budapest, Catania, Dublin, Edinburgh,
Leeds, Leipzig, Lisbon, Liverpool, London, Madrid, Malaga, Manchester, Marseille, Milan,
Nantes, Nice, Nuernberg, Oporto, Palma de Mallorca, Palermo, Rome, Strasbourg, Turin,
Valencia, Venice, and Warsaw. However, the majority of the possible combinations among
those cities are not served by Ryanair, so that only a small number of drawn routes were
affected.
These steps give the 92 connections between cities underlying our final sample. For each
of them, we randomly assigned one of the two cities as departing city for the outbound flight
and the other one as the departing city for the return flight. Table 6 lists the resulting
cross-section of routes.
B.2 Affiliate groups
Our baseline measure for competition treats airlines that are affiliated through cross-holdings
as single competitors. An airline is matched to an affiliate group if a member of that group
owns more than 25% of the airline’s equity. This is in line with the observed pricing practices
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in our sample, which show little variation within affiliate groups.44 Out of the airlines observed
in our sample, we have identified the following affiliate groups based on this criterion.
• Aegean, Aegean Airlines, Olympic
• Air France, KLM
• Air One, Alitalia, Meridiana fly, Wind Jet
• British Airways, Iberia, Vueling Airlines
• Air Dolomiti, Austrian Airlines, bmi, Brussels Airlines, Condor, Germanwings, Lufthansa,
SunExpress, Swiss International Air Lines
• Blue 1, Cimber Sterling, Norwegian Air Shuttle, SAS, Spanair
• airberlin, Niki
• LAN Airlines, TAM Airlines, TAM Brazilian Airlines
• Singapore Airlines, Virgin Atlantic
• Air Seychelles, Etihad Airways
• Aeroflot-Russian Airlines, Malev Hungarian Airlines
C Robustness specifications
C.1 Alternative competition measures
This appendix contains some robustness analysis with respect to our baseline approach to
measure competition.
First, we consider two variations of our baseline approach to identify the number of
competitors. Specifically, in our baseline measure, we treat codesharing airlines as competitors.
Accordingly, if the same physical connection is marketed under different flight numbers that
correspond to different (non-affiliated) airlines, this increases our measure of competition.
The reasoning behind this choice is that in so-called “block space” codeshare agreements, each
of the codesharing partner still controls a distinct, ex ante fixed amount of seats. In practice,
by the pricing agreements between the carrier operating a service and the codesharing partner,
44The median within-ijtd standard-deviation of prices among members of the same affiliate group is 0
Euros, whereas the corresponding median dispersion for the same physical flight offered on the same date
among codesharing partners across affiliate groups is 60.13 Euros (see also Footnote 46).
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the codesharer is usually granted considerable freedom to set prices independently.45 In line
with that, prices in our data differ indeed substantially across different codesharers.46
To evaluate whether implicit pricing agreements between codesharing airlines systemati-
cally affect our findings, we consider N cshijt as a first alternative, which defines competition as
the number of airlines that operate their own services on a particular market.47 Similarly,
we also consider Nallieijt , which counts the number of competing airline alliances, for which
a similar concern might be raised.48 Finally, we also use the Herfindahl index, which is a
common alternative used in the literature.49 For each of these measures, we consider both a
log and a level variant.50
Table 7 reports the results to the following estimation:
ln(Priceijtd) = (α + βDayslefttd)× Compijt + λi + µj + νt + ξd + ijtd, (8)
where Compijt is a stand-in for the eight competition measures that we consider, and where λi,
µj , νt, and ξd are treated as fixed-effects. The first thing to note, as can be seen in Panel (b),
is that all competition measures yield the same qualitative conclusions as our baseline setup.
In order to assess the quantitative implications across the variety of competition measures, we
compute the linear combination of the baseline slope (Panel a) with the competition effects
for the minimum and maximum realization of competition for each of the measures. The
implied range of intertemporal slopes for each of our measures is reported in Panel (c). Here
it can be seen that also quantitatively, the different measures yield very similar conclusions:
While the different measures find a daily price increase ranging from 1.27 percent to 1.39
percent for the least competitive routes in our sample, the daily price increase estimated for
45See, e.g., the report by the European Commission, “Competition impact of airline code-share agreements:
Final report” (2007), available on the EC Website (last checked: October 2012).
46In our data set, 21.1 percent of the same physical roundtrip combinations ij for a given travel date t and
a given date of the ticket offer d are on average offered by more than one codesharing operator (not counting
codesharing within our affiliate group definitions). Among those observations, prices for a given flight sold at
a given day differ across codesharing partners in 83.3 percent of the cases with a median within-ijtd standard
deviation across codesharers of 60.13 Euros, suggesting that there is indeed significant leeway for independent
pricing among codesharing partners.
47To be consistent with this approach, we also pool all physically identical roundtrips into a single
observation, where at each date the pooled roundtrip is assigned the lowest price offered by any of the
codesharing partners.
48Specifically, Nallieijt treats all airlines within “Star Alliance”, “Sky Team” and “One World” as single
competitors. Airlines not belonging to any of these alliances are counted as independent competitors according
to our baseline competition measure.
49Since a Herfindahl index of one indexes the highest concentration of market power, we use −Hijt to make
it qualitatively comparable with the other measures.
50To facilitate the comparison across the different measures which share different supports (the Herfindahl
index is defined on the real line, whereas Nijt, N
csh
ijt , and N
allie
ijt are natural numbers with different ranges),
we adopt linear specifications for each of the competition measures in our estimation.
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the most competitive routes ranges from 0.87 percent to 1.02 percent.
C.2 Alternative customer heterogeneity measures
In this appendix, we consider some alternatives to the customer heterogeneity measures
considered in the main body of the paper.
As a first alternative, we use two measures aimed at capturing variations in the customer
heterogeneity across time. Specifically, we use dummy variables (Weekendt and Holidayst)
to distinguish weekend trips (departing on Friday and returning on Sunday) from trips that
depart on Monday and return on Thursday, and to identify roundtrips over the Christmas
and New Years holidays.
The next two alternatives are based on an idea by Brueckner, Dyer and Spiller (1992)
who argue that a good proxy for the share of leisure travelers on a route are temperature
differentials between the destination and origin.51 Accordingly, we define ∆Tempijt as the
temperature differentials between destination and origin during the month of travel. In the
same spirit, we also use ∆Precijt to measure precipitation differentials between destination
and origin during the month of travel.
Finally, we use regional GDP data to measure for business activity.52 Accordingly, GDP oij
and GDP dij are defined as log GDP at the origin and destination, respectively.
To give an overview over these measures, Figure 5 plots their means (marked by circled
dots), standard deviation bands (marked by boxes), and supports (marked by lines) conditional
on the number of competitors. Again the correlation across competition levels is typically
small relative to the standard deviation and supports, although somewhat larger than for our
two baseline measures.
To investigate how changes in customer heterogeneity affect the sensitivity of the intertem-
poral slope to competition, we use the same empirical model as in Section 5:
ln(Priceijtd) = (α + βDayslefttd)×Xijt + λi + µj + νt + ξd + ijtd, (9)
with
Xijt = (1, Nijt, Hetijt, Nijt ×Hetijt),
where Nijt is the number of competitors, Hetijt is the corresponding customer heterogeneity
measure, and λi, µj, νt and ξd are treated as fixed effects. Again, we normalize Hetijt to
have zero mean and unit variance. Here β is the relevant vector of “slope” coefficients that
51See also Stavins (2001) and Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), who have used similar temperature-based
proxies to measure for tourist intensities.
52We use GDP data provided by the European commission at the NUTS-2 level. See also Footnote 23.
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Figure 5: Summary of alternative tourist intensity measures.
Notes: Means and ±1 standard deviation bands are indicated by the circled dots and boxes. Supports are
indicated by the extending lines. Competition categories are indicated on the x-axis.
define the intertemporal slope. Table 8 contains the estimated coefficients and standard
errors (clustered at the market level). For convenience, Columns 1 and 2 reprint the results
for our baseline measures.
As before, we look at the impact of Hetijt on the slope in monopoly markets to determine
whether it is likely to increase or decrease customer heterogeneity. Accordingly, we interpret
Hetijt as increasing in the customer heterogeneity if
∂2 ln(Priceijtd)
∂Dayslefttd ∂Hetijt
∣∣∣∣
Nijt=1
= βHet + βN×Het < 0,
and vice versa. Applying this criterion to the estimated models, we classify increases in
∆Precijt and GDP
d
ij as increasing customer heterogeneity, and classify increases in Weekendt,
Holidayst and GDP
o
ij as decreasing customer heterogeneity. For ∆Tempijt, its impact on the
intertemporal slope is not statistically different from zero, both economically and statistically
(at the 5 percent level). With this qualification in mind, increases in ∆Tempijt are increasing
customer heterogeneity according to our classification approach. For convenience, these
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classifications are listed at the bottom of Table 8.
Recall that for the sensitivity to increase in more heterogeneous markets, the slope
coefficient for Nijt × Hetijt has to go into the same direction as the impact of Hetijt on
heterogeneity. That is, if we have associated Hetijt with an increase in heterogeneity, then
the slope coefficient for Nijt×Hetijt has to be positive in order for the intertemporal slope to
be more sensitive to increases in competition in more heterogeneous markets, and vice versa.
Comparing the above classifications with the slope coefficients on Nijt × Hetijt, these
estimations confirm the conclusions based on hotel bookings data for all measures except
∆Tempijt (for which we could not reject the possibility of a false classification at the 5 percent
level). Looking again at the sensitivity to competition for Hetijt at one standard deviation
above and below its mean,
∂2 ln(Price)
∂Dayslefttd ∂Nijt
∣∣∣∣
Hetijt=±1
= βN ± βN×Het.
we see that all measures with the exception of ∆Tempijt yield similar patterns (but to a lesser
extent) to the ones seen for our baseline measures. The difference is likely to result from a
somewhat looser correlation between these alternative measures and customer heterogeneity,
so that evaluation Hetijt at one standard deviation above and below its mean is likely to
map into an actual customer heterogeneity evaluated substantially within its one standard
deviation circle.
C.3 Non-monotonic impact of customer heterogeneity
In this section, we generalize our approach in the main body of the paper to evaluate how
the sensitivity of the intertemporal slope to competition changes with customer heterogeneity
in a potential non-monotonic fashion. This addresses the concern that on routes where
there is a small number of tourists, additional tourists may increase the heterogeneity of the
customer base, whereas on markets with a large share of tourists, the same change may reduce
heterogeneity. We do not find strong signs of non-monotonicity, justifying our approach in
the main body of the paper.
We use the following quadratic specification in Hetijt to allow for such non-monotonicities:
ln(Priceijtd) = (α + βDayslefttd)×Xijt + λi + µj + νt + ξd + ijtd, (10)
with
Xijt = (1, Nijt, Hetijt, Het
2
ijt, Nijt ×Hetijt, Nijt ×Het2ijt),
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where Nijt is the number of competitors, Hetijt is the corresponding customer heterogeneity
measure, and λi, µj, νt and ξd are treated as fixed effects. To ensure that computing the
quadratic terms is a positive monotonic transformation, we normalize Hetijt to have positive
support.
To identify whether a certain change in Hetijt increases or decreases heterogeneity, we
generalize our previous approach to look at the impact of Hetijt on the intertemporal slope in
monopoly markets. In particular, we interpret a change in Hetijt as an increase in customer
heterogeneity if
∂2 ln(Priceijtd)
∂Dayslefttd∂Hetijt
∣∣∣∣
Nijt=1
= βHet + βN×Het + 2 (βHet2 + βN×Het2)Hetijt < 0,
and vice versa. Note that through the quadratic term, the classification may now change
with Hetijt. For example, we could have that the heterogeneity is increasing in the tourist
intensity if the tourist intensity is absolute low, but is decreasing once the market is satiated
with tourists.
Based on this criterion, we do not find any evidence for a non-monotonic impact on
customer heterogeneity. Both Durationijt and Intensityij have a positive impact on hetero-
geneity throughout their complete support, motivating the non-monotonic treatment in the
main body of the paper.
Figure 6 plots the estimated sensitivity of the intertemporal slope to competition as a
function of Hetijt, formally given by the cross-derivative of the identified model in Dayslefttd
and Nijt:
∂2 ln(Priceijtd)
∂Dayslefttd∂Nijt
= βN + βN×HetHetijt + βN×Het2Het
2
ijt.
Not surprising giving the monotonic impact of Hetijt, the sensitivity of the slope to
competition is literally “in line” with the linear setup in the main body, yielding a sensitivity
that ranges from zero at the 5th percentile of Hetijt (largely homogenous markets by
our classification) to somewhat above 0.15 and 0.20, respectively, at the 95th percentile
(substantially heterogeneous markets by our classification).
C.4 Competition-specific impact of customer heterogeneity
This appendix section generalizes the analysis in the main body of the paper to allow for a
competition-specific impact of customer heterogeneity.
To investigate how changes in customer heterogeneity affect the sensitivity of the intertem-
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Figure 6: Sensitivity of intertemporal slope to competition.
Notes: Plots display the impact of Nijt on the intertemporal slope as a function of Hetijt, resulting from a
quadratic specification in Hetijt. On the x-axes, Hetijt is scaled proportional to its own scale with labels
displaying the corresponding percentiles. The y-axes display the cross-derivative of the estimated model in
Nijt and Dayslefttd. Hetijt are properly normalized to have a positive support. The estimations control
for levels of Nijt, Hetijt, Het
2
ijt, Nijt ×Hetijt, Nijt ×Het2ijt; the same variables interacted with Dayslefttd;
and fixed effects λi, µj , νt and ξd.
poral slope to competition, we estimate the following model:
ln(Priceijtd) = (α + βDayslefttd)×Xijt + λi + µj + νt + ξd + ijtd, (11)
with
Xijt = (Compijt, Compijt ×Hetijt),
where Hetijt is the corresponding customer heterogeneity measure, Compijt × Hetijt is a
vector of interaction effects between Hetijt and all competition dummies
53, and λi, µj, νt
and ξd are treated as fixed effects. To facilitate the discussion below, we normalize Hetijt
to have zero mean and unit variance within the corresponding competition category when
interacting with Compijt. Here β is the relevant vector of “slope” coefficients that define the
intertemporal slope. The impact of Hetijt for Compijt = 6 is not identifiable due to zero
variation (see Figure 4). We therefore pool 5 and 6 competitors to a “Compijt = 5+” category.
Table 9 contains the estimated coefficients and standard errors (clustered at the market level).
From Panel (a) it can be seen that the non-interacted slope coefficients are again similar to
our baseline model in Section 4, likely because there is little correlation between Hetijt and
Compijt. Accordingly, prices are again unambiguously increasing as the scheduled travel date
approaches, but at an intertemporal slope that “flattens” in more competitive environments.
53Since Compijt covers all competition categories there is no need to include Hetijt by itself.
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Figure 7: Empirical relationships between intertemporal slope and competition for different degrees of
customer heterogeneity.
Notes: The intertemporal slopes are denominated in daily price changes in percent. The medium heterogeneity
lines are evaluated at the mean value (within-competition) of the corresponding tourist measure. The high
and low heterogeneity lines are evaluated at the mean ±1 standard deviation. The tourist measure underlying
panel (a) is Durationij ; the measure underlying panel (b) is Intensityij . All computations are based on the
regressions reported in Table 9.
To evaluate the hypothesis that the intertemporal slope is more sensitive to competition in
more heterogeneous markets, we again need to take a stand on whether our tourist intensity
measures increase or decrease the customer heterogeneity in a given market. As before,
we interpret changes in Hetijt that steepen the intertemporal slope on monopoly routes as
increases in the customer heterogeneity. Given model (11), this is true if
∂2 ln(Priceijtd)
∂Dayslefttd ∂Hetijt
∣∣∣∣
Nijt=1
= β(Comp=1)×Het < 0,
which—as in the main body of the paper—is the case for both our measures.
To give an overview over how changes in competition affect the intertemporal slope,
Figure 7 plots the intertemporal slope as a function of the number of competitors at different
values of Hetijt. Similar to the thought experiment conducted in the main body of the paper,
we plot the intertemporal slope for “low” and “high” heterogeneity markets (evaluated at
one standard deviation below and above the competition-specific mean of Hetijt), as well as
for a “medium” heterogeneity market evaluated at the mean.
While the linear model in the main body assumes that the intertemporal slope is linear in
competition (with the derivative defining the “sensitivity” to competition), the competition-
specific setup considered here allows for an arbitrary relation. Reassuring our findings in
the main body, we however find that the sensitivity is nearly constant conditional on Hetijt.
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As before, the intertemporal slope is highly sensitive to competition in high heterogeneity
markets, as is predicted by theories of competitive price discrimination. In contrast, reducing
the customer heterogeneity in a given market to one standard deviation below its mean,
makes the intertemporal slope largely invariant to competition, in line with the idea that in
homogeneous markets airlines do not price-discriminate to begin with so that they are also
not restrict in their ability to do so by competition.
To reconcile these findings quantitatively with the linear model in the main body, Panel (b)
of Table 9 also reports the “average” sensitivity to competition, amounting to the average
change in the intertemporal slope displayed in Figure 7:
1
supp(N)
∫
N
∂2 ln(Priceijt)
∂Daysleftijt ∂Nijt
∣∣∣∣
Hetijt=±1
≈ 1
4
5∑
N=2
{[
βComp=N − βComp=N−1
]
±
[
β(Comp=N)×Het − β(Comp=N−1)×Het
]}
.
Not surprising given the nearly linear relation in Figure 7, the implied sensitivities are
numerically consistent with our linear model, motivating the simplified exposition in the
main body of the paper.
D Additional figures and tables
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Figure 8: Unsystematic pricing dynamics versus unsystematic variations in the intertemporal slope.
Notes: The figure displays fictitious price data in 2 markets. Panel (a) displays how projected data based on
a linear fit explains most of the dispersion (86 percent of the average Gini of markets 1 and 2)—reflecting
that systematically increasing prices are the main source behind the observed dispersion. Panel (b) illustrates
how at the same time, the fitted model fails to explain any of the variation in the market-specific slopes. The
left panel is akin to the exercise conducted in Section 7.1. Section 7.2 explores, in contrast, how much of the
variation in slopes depicted in Panel (b) is explainable by variations in customer heterogeneity.
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Table 5: Explanatory power of customer heterogeneity
Part of Xrt (1) (2) (3)
Comprt Yes Yes Yes
Comprt ⊗Hetrt Yes Yes
Comprt ⊗ (Router, F lightdatet) Yes
R-squared 0.05 0.17 0.63
Notes: The dependent variable is Srt (the intertemporal slope in market rt, estimated by market-specific first
stage regressions on Dayslefttd and a constant). Comprt, Router and Flightdatet are vectors containing
a full set of competition, route, and flight date dummies, and Hetrt is a vector containing all herogeneity
measures. The number of observations are 3 311 (all markets with variation in Dayslefttd and available
heterogeneity data).
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Table 6: List of routes
Origin Destination Origin Destination Origin Destination
Aberdeen Manchester London Bordeaux Paris Dublin
Amsterdam Barcelona London Frankfurt Paris Hamburg
Amsterdam Zurich London Hannover Paris London
Athens Budapest London Prague Paris Madrid
Athens London London Sofia Paris Marseille
Barcelona Lyon London Zurich Paris Prague
Belgrade Vienna Liverpool Amsterdam Paris Stockholm
Berlin Helsinki Lyon Madrid Paris Turin
Berlin Vienna Madrid Barcelona Paris Valencia
Bilbao Paris Madrid Copenhagen Paris Warsaw
Bologna Madrid Madrid Lisbon Palermo Turin
Bordeaux Madrid Madrid Milan Prague Helsinki
Bordeaux Nantes Madrid Stockholm Prague Milan
Brussels Leeds Madrid Valencia Prague Rome
Brussels London Madrid Zurich Rome Nice
Bucharest Milan Malaga Madrid Rome Vienna
Budapest Munich Milan Copenhagen Stockholm Berlin
Copenhagen Geneva Milan Duesseldorf Stockholm Duesseldorf
Copenhagen Helsinki Milan Frankfurt Stockholm Oslo
Duesseldorf Athens Milan Lyon Stuttgart Milan
Edinburgh Manchester Milan Paris Strasbourg Paris
Frankfurt Innsbruck Moscow Budapest Toulouse Brussels
Frankfurt Istanbul Munich Athens Toulouse Paris
Frankfurt Madrid Munich Madrid Vienna Amsterdam
Frankfurt Moscow Munich Paris Vienna Barcelona
Frankfurt Paris Munich Vienna Vienna Frankfurt
Frankfurt Toulouse Naples Milan Vienna Lyon
Hamburg Warsaw Nice Brussels Vienna Paris
Hannover Amsterdam Nuremberg Amsterdam Zurich Frankfurt
Leipzig Munich Oporto Paris Zurich Mallorca
Lisbon Amsterdam Paris Copenhagen
Notes: Prices are recorded for 41 distinct travel dates for each route. In 10 instances, we did not find any of
our roundtrip combinations offered; 7 of them missing on the route Brussels–Leeds; the remaining 3 markets
are missing on the routes Bordeaux–Madrid, Moscow–Budapest and Stockholm–Berlin.
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Table 9: Customer heterogeneity and intertemporal price dispersion by market competitiveness
(1) (2)
Customer Heterogeneity Measure: Durationij Intensityij
(a) Estimated Slope Coefficients
(Compijt = 1)×Dayslefttd −1.36 −1.30
(0.10) (0.10)
(Compijt = 2)×Dayslefttd −1.26 −1.22
(0.10) (0.10)
(Compijt = 3)×Dayslefttd −1.22 −1.18
(0.10) (0.10)
(Compijt = 4)×Dayslefttd −1.12 −1.08
(0.10) (0.10)
(Compijt = 5+)×Dayslefttd −1.02 −0.98
(0.10) (0.10)
(Compijt = 1)×Hetijt ×Dayslefttd −0.10 −0.11
(0.02) (0.02)
(Compijt = 2)×Hetijt ×Dayslefttd −0.00 −0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
(Compijt = 3)×Hetijt ×Dayslefttd 0.08 0.05
(0.02) (0.01)
(Compijt = 4)×Hetijt ×Dayslefttd 0.11 0.18
(0.03) (0.02)
(Compijt = 5+)×Hetijt ×Dayslefttd 0.17 0.17
(0.04) (0.04)
(b) Sensitivity and Overall Slope
Low heterogeneity markets
average sensitivity to competition 0.02 0.01
implied monopoly slope −1.25 −1.19
implied competitive slope (Nijt = 5+) −1.19 −1.15
High heterogeneity markets
average sensitivity to competition 0.15 0.15
implied monopoly slope −1.46 −1.41
implied competitive slope (Nijt = 5+) −0.84 −0.81
Observations 1 255 125 1 286 687
R-squared (adj.) 0.57 0.57
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(Priceijtd). Unreported but included in the estimations are levels of
Compijt, Compijt ×Hetijt, and fixed effects λi, µj , νt and ξd. The variable used for Hetijt is indicated at
the top of each column. Hetijt is transformed to have zero mean and unit variance within the corresponding
competition category when interacted with competition. Clustered standard errors (at the market level) are
reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. All coefficients
are significant at the 0.1 percent level, except for (Compijt = 2) × Hetijt × Dayslefttd. Low and high
heterogeneity markets in Panel (b) are defined as markets with Hetijt = ±1 standard deviation relative to
the mean in the corresponding competition category. Number of observations depends on availability of
heterogeneity data.
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Figure 9: Nonlinear estimation of pricing dynamics with p = 0.80 (top panels) and p = 0.90 (bottom panels)
confidence bands.
Notes: Coefficients are multiplied by 100 and are normalized relative to the prices 1 day (left panel) and 38
days (right panel) before takeoff. To increase readability, the support is truncated in the right panels at 5
weeks before departure. The relative price changes prior to 5 weeks before departure are not statistically
different from each other. For a complete picture and further details see Figure 3 and the description in the
main text.
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